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The Case for the Retroactive 
Application of Crawford v. Washington 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Confrontation Clause, embedded in the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantees all 
criminal defendants the right to confront their accusers.1  
Described as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth,”2 the right of confrontation is considered 
essential to a fair trial.3  Indeed, it is one of the “fundamental 
  
 1 The full text of the Amendment reads, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added). 
 2 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (citing 5 Wigmore § 1367). 
 3 In Kirby v. United States, the Supreme Court referred to the Confrontation 
Clause as “[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,” and “a right long 
deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded against 
legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution of the United States 
and in the constitutions of most if not of all the States composing the Union.” 174 U.S. 
47, 55-56 (1899). 
  Pointer v. Texas declared, “[t]he fact that this right appears in the Sixth 
Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and 
safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a 
criminal prosecution.”  The Court continued that, “the decisions of this Court and other 
courts throughout the years have constantly emphasized the necessity for cross-
examination as a protection for defendants in criminal cases.”  380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) 
(footnote omitted). 
  Moreover, in 1807 Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “I know of no principal in 
the preservation of which all are more concerned.  I know none, by undermining which, 
life, liberty and property, might be more endangered.  It is therefore incumbent on 
courts to be watchful of every inroad on a principal so truly important.”  United States 
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 193 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). 
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guarantees of life and liberty,”4 and “an essential and 
fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this 
country’s constitutional goal.”5   
In March of 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford 
v. Washington,6 redefining the landscape of Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence.7 Crawford announced that no 
testimonial statement may be admitted at trial against a 
criminal defendant unless the defendant has the opportunity to 
cross examine the declarant.8  In short, Crawford significantly 
reinterpreted the Confrontation Clause’s force and effect. 
When the Supreme Court promulgates a rule, as in 
Crawford, criminal defendants with pending litigation gain 
access to the rule’s application on direct appeal.  In order for a 
criminal defendant who has exhausted all direct appellate 
avenues, and whose conviction is final, to benefit from a recent 
Court decision, however, he must attempt to do so on collateral 
review.9  If a rule is important enough, courts may apply it 
  
 4 Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55; accord Pointer, 380 U.S. at 410 (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (referring to the right of cross-examination as “[o]ne of the fundamental 
guarantees of life and liberty,” “one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial,” and, “as 
indispensable an ingredient as the ‘right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a 
judge.’”) (citations omitted). 
 5 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added). 
 6 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 7 See, e.g., Neil P. Cohen & Donald F. Paine, Crawford v. Washington:  
Confrontation Revolution, 40 TENN. B.J. 22, 22 (May 2004) (“On March 8, 2004, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided Michael Crawford’s appeal from a Washington State 
conviction for assault and totally revised the modern approach to the Confrontation 
Clause.”) (citation omitted); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:  
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 511 
(2005) (“In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court of the United States radically 
changed [the] Confrontation Clause doctrine . . . .”); Rene L. Valladares, Crawford v. 
Washington:  The Confrontation Clause Gets Teeth, 12 NEV. LAW. 12, 12 (Sept. 2004) 
(“The Court’s decision is anticipated to cause rapid and profound changes in how 
hearsay statements are used against a defendant in a criminal trial.  Appellate courts 
have described Crawford as being a ‘bombshell,’ and a ‘paradigm shift in confrontation 
clause analysis.’”); John F. Yetter, Wrestling with Crawford v. Washington and the New 
Constitutional Law of Confrontation, 78 FLA. BAR J. 26, 26 (Oct. 2004) (“The Court 
erased a body of precedent that was, if not completely favorable to the prosecution, well 
understood and generally accommodating to the use of hearsay evidence without the 
necessity of calling the declarant as a witness.”). 
 8 Prior to Crawford, the Supreme Court case that articulated the governing 
Confrontation Clause doctrine was Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Under Roberts, 
statements were routinely admitted at trial, without the defendant’s ability to cross-
examine the declarant, if they were deemed reliable. Id. at 57.  See Part II, infra, for a 
discussion of Crawford and Roberts. 
 9 A defendant convicted in state court can seek collateral review using either 
state or federal procedures.  Usually, a state defendant will invoke state collateral 
procedures before federal collateral procedures, though not required to do so.  “After 
state collateral procedures have been used unsuccessfully, the defendant may try 
federal collateral remedies, especially federal habeas corpus.”  NEIL P. COHEN & 
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retroactively on collateral review, thus broadening the rule to 
reach even those defendants with final convictions.10  
Therefore, if Crawford is deemed retroactive, a defendant with 
a final conviction may seek collateral review alleging Crawford 
violations, even if Crawford was decided after the conviction 
became final. 
The Supreme Court generally disfavors retroactivity, 
and accordingly, has fashioned a standard difficult to satisfy. 11  
In fact, under the Supreme Court’s current standard no “new” 
rule has been applied retroactivity.12  Crawford, however, is a 
rule of paramount importance.  The Constitution guarantees 
the right of confrontation, yet, prior to Crawford the law ran 
afoul of that Constitutional mandate.  Crawford corrected a 
serious flaw in the Court’s Confronation Clause jurisprudence, 
and its rule is so crucial to the legitimacy of criminal 
proceedings that it must be applied retroactively. 
Part II of this Note discusses the significance of 
Crawford’s holding by recapitulating the weaknesses of the 
pre-Crawford test and describing the improvements made by 
Crawford.  Part III summarizes the high bar set by the 
Supreme Court’s current retroactivity doctrine, specifically 
Teague v. Lane13 and its progeny.  More specifically, Part III 
elaborates on the contours of the second exception to Teague’s 
  
DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS CASES AND 
MATERIALS 805 (2d ed. 2000).   
  The federal habeas statute provides that a federal court “shall entertain an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody . . . on the 
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States.”  28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (1982); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 1312 (4th ed. 2004) (“[T]hrough the federal writ of habeas corpus, a state 
defendant may challenge his state conviction on federal constitutional grounds in the 
federal courts.”). 
  A defendant convicted in federal court can file a Motion to Vacate Sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction.  “A § 
2255 Motion involves virtually the same issues and procedures as federal habeas 
corpus.”  COHEN & HALL, supra note 9, at 848. 
 10 See LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 1359-61. 
 11 See, e.g., id. at 1359 (“[T]he second Teague exception is quite restrictive.”); 
Cohen & Hall, supra note 9, at 843 (“Recent Supreme Court decisions have greatly 
reduced the chances that a habeas corpus petitioner will be able to get relief based on a 
recent decision or a novel theory.”). 
 12 “Beginning with the rule at issue in Teague, the Court has measured at 
least eleven new rules, or proposed new rules, of criminal procedure against the 
criteria for the second exception and, in every case, has refused to apply the rule 
retroactively.” United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 529 (2d Cir. 2000). The 
Second Circuit proceeded to list a number of cases illustrating this pattern.  Id.  See 
also Part III.A, infra, to learn what constitutes a “new” rule. 
 13 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (establishing the current standard for “new” rule 
retroactivity).  For a further discussion of the Teague standard, see infra Part III. 
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general bar to retroactivity.  Part IV argues that the Crawford 
rule fits within the narrowly construed second Teague 
exception.  It does so by drawing from the Court’s language in 
Crawford, discussing pre-Teague precedent, distinguishing the 
previous rules that the Supreme Court has declined to make 
retroactive, and analogizing the Crawford rule to a rule that 
achieved retroactivity under Teague in lower state and federal 
courts. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Crawford’s Facts and Procedural History 
On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford and his wife 
Sylvia visited a friend, Rubin Richard Kenneth Lee.14  During 
the visit Michael Crawford stabbed Lee because Crawford 
thought Lee sexually assaulted Sylvia.15  After the police 
apprehended Michael Crawford, he and Sylvia each gave 
recorded statements to the police in which they recounted the 
events that precipitated the stabbing.16  Their statements 
differed in one very significant way; Michael said that Lee 
reached for a weapon of his own before Michael stabbed him, 
intimating that Michael acted in self-defense, while Sylvia said 
she never saw Lee with a weapon, intimating that Michael was 
the lone aggressor.17  Michael Crawford was then prosecuted 
for assault and attempted murder.18 
At trial, Michael Crawford claimed self-defense.19  Sylvia 
Crawford did not testify because Michael Crawford invoked 
Washington’s marital privilege, which allowed him to prevent 
his wife from testifying against him.20  The prosecution did, 
however, introduce her tape-recorded statement incriminating 
Michael, despite the fact that she was not available to be cross-
  
 14 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 38-40. 
 17 Id. at 38-39 (“Sylvia generally corroborated petitioner’s story about the 
events leading up to the fight, but her account of the fight itself was arguably 
different – particularly with respect to whether Lee had drawn a weapon before 
petitioner assaulted him . . . .”)  Michael Crawford said, “I think that he pulled 
somethin’ out and I grabbed for it and that’s how I got cut,” while Sylvia, when asked if 
she saw anything in Lee’s hands, said “um um (no).”  Id. at 39-40. 
 18 Id. at 40. 
 19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (2004). 
 20 Id. 
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examined.21  Her statement that Lee did not have a weapon 
was fatal to Michael Crawford’s self-defense claim,22 and he 
was convicted of assault.23 
Crawford then challenged his conviction on the grounds 
that the admission of Sylvia’s statement violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation.24  The Washington Supreme 
Court, applying the then-controlling United States Supreme 
Court precedent, Ohio v. Roberts,25 upheld Crawford’s 
conviction, concluding that Sylvia’s statement “bore guarantees 
of trustworthiness.”26  Crawford then appealed his conviction to 
the United States Supreme Court.27 
B. Hearsay 
Statements, like Sylvia’s, made out-of-court and offered 
as evidence to prove that which they assert are hearsay.28  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence29 generally bar hearsay because 
hearsay is thought to be unreliable.  Underlying the hearsay 
rule is the idea that if the declarant—the one who made the 
statement—is not in court there is no way to judge the veracity 
of the statement; hence, the statement is presumptively 
unreliable.30  The Federal Rules of Evidence do, however, 
  
 21 Id. 
 22 In fact, in closing argument the prosecutor referred to Sylvia’s statement 
as “‘damning evidence’ that ‘completely refute[d] [Crawford’s] claim of self-defense.’”  
Id. at 40-41. 
 23 Id. at 41. 
 24 Id. at 40-41. 
 25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41 (“The Washington Supreme 
Court . . . conclud[ed] that, although Sylvia’s statement did not fall under a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness . . . .”).  The test from 
Roberts allowed for the admission of ex-parte testimony if it bore “adequate ‘indicia of 
reliability.’”  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  To satisfy that test, evidence had 
to either fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id. 
 26 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41. 
 27 Id. 
 28 FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.”) (adopting the common law definition of hearsay).  Michael 
Crawford was convicted in state court, and hence, the applicable rules of evidence were 
those of the State of Washington.  This Note refers to the Federal Rules to exemplify 
the law of evidence, and not to imply that they were used at Michael Crawford’s trial. 
 29 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided 
by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority or by Act of Congress.”). 
 30 “[T]he chief goal of the hearsay rule is to enhance the fact-finding process 
by excluding certain declarations whenever the declarants cannot be subjected to cross-
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provide for exceptions.  In other words, there are situations in 
which statements, though hearsay, may be admitted 
nonetheless.31  These exceptions generally proceed on the 
notion that some statements, though made out-of-court, are 
still reliable enough to be valuable as evidence.  For example, 
Rule 804(b)(3) provides that hearsay statements made against 
the declarant’s interest are admissible.32  The Rules of Evidence 
consider statements against interest more reliable than other 
hearsay because the Rules assume that declarants do not make 
untruthful statements that are self-incriminating.   
Sylvia Crawford’s statement was clearly hearsay.  It 
was made out-of-court, and it was offered by the prosecution to 
prove what it asserted—that Lee did not have a weapon.  The 
court, however, admitted her statement against her husband 
under Washington’s version of the “statement against interest” 
exception because, as the argument went, Sylvia implicated 
herself as an accomplice in the assault, and therefore, she 
would not have made the statement had it not been true.33  
Accordingly, the court admitted her statement at trial, even 
though Michael Crawford was unable to cross-examine her.34 
C. The Confrontation Clause 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides 
criminal defendants with an extra layer of protection against 
hearsay statements.  By guaranteeing the defendant the right 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, the 
Confrontation Clause aims to insure that certain statements, 
notwithstanding the rules of hearsay, be excluded unless the 
declarant is cross-examined.  Thus, even if a statement fits 
  
examination. The rule achieves this goal by permitting the opposing party to object to 
the use of out-of-court statements that are offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. Since the use of hearsay can deprive the opponent of an opportunity to 
challenge the credibility of the hearsay declarant, the rule proceeds on the assumption 
that cross-examination is vital to assuring the reliability of evidence.”  Miguel A. 
Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 574 (2004). 
 31 FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (listing statements not included in the definition of 
hearsay, and thus, not barred by Rule 802), 803 (listing hearsay exceptions that apply 
even if the declarant is available), 804 (listing hearsay exceptions that apply only if the 
declarant is unavailable), 807 (providing for the residual exception). 
 32 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 33 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (“Noting that Sylvia had admitted she led 
petitioner to Lee’s apartment and thus had facilitated the assault, the State invoked 
the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.”) (citing WASH. R. EVID. 
804(b)(3) (2003)). 
 34 Id. at 40-41. 
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within a hearsay exception it will be inadmissible if it runs 
afoul of the Confrontation Clause.35 
Therefore, insofar as hearsay declarants constitute 
“witnesses against” a criminal defendant for the purposes of 
the Confrontation Clause, the Constitution bars admission of 
the statements.36  Not all hearsay admitted against a criminal 
defendant implicates the Confrontation Clause, however, and 
prior to Crawford the Supreme Court struggled to define 
exactly what kind of hearsay would trigger the right of 
confrontation.37 
The Supreme Court first attempted to formulate a 
workable Confrontation Clause doctrine in Ohio v. Roberts.38  
Roberts articulated a two-part test for the admission of hearsay 
against the accused, informed by the Court’s pragmatic 
balancing of society’s interests in law enforcement and finality 
against an individual’s constitutional right to confrontation.39  
Hearsay was admissible under Roberts if, first, the declarant 
was unavailable, and second, the hearsay statement bore 
“indicia of reliability.”40  If the statement qualified under a 
“firmly rooted hearsay exception” it was presumptively 
reliable.41  Otherwise, a statement could still be admissible if it 
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”42  In other 
words, under Roberts, if the declarant was unavailable, and the 
  
 35 See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE STATUTORY AND 
CASE SUPPLEMENT 394 (2004-05) (“[T]he Constitution is a higher law than the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, but not necessarily a stricter law.  Evidence permitted by the rules 
of evidence but forbidden by the Confrontation Clause must stay out.  Evidence 
permitted by the Confrontation Clause but excluded by the rules of evidence also must 
stay out.”). 
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 37 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 35, at 393-94. 
 38 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  Prior to Roberts, “the Court issued a number of ad hoc 
judgments to resolve particular controversies, but made little attempt to systematize 
the Confrontation Clause’s impact on the admission of hearsay.”  FISHER, supra note 
34, at 394. 
 39 In Roberts, the Court recognized that: 
[C]ompeting interests, if “closely examined” may warrant dispensing with 
confrontation at trial. ‘[G]eneral rules of law of this kind, however beneficent 
in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’ Significantly, 
every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law enforcement, and in 
the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable 
in criminal proceedings. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (citations omitted). 
 40 Id. at 66. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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statement was deemed reliable, the hearsay was admissible 
notwithstanding the absence of confrontation.43  Accordingly, 
the Washington Supreme Court rejected Michael Crawford’s 
Confrontation Clause challenge because the court concluded 
that, under Roberts, Sylvia’s statement bore “guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”44   
D. Crawford’s Holding 
On March 8, 2004, however, a unanimous Supreme 
Court reversed Crawford’s conviction on the grounds that the 
use of Sylvia Crawford’s statement violated Michael Crawford’s 
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers.45  Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion, joined by six justices,46 overruled 
Roberts,47 and formulated a new standard to govern the 
admissibility of hearsay statements against a criminal 
defendant. 
Under Crawford, the reliability of the statement is 
irrelevant; the nature of the statement is all that matters.48  
Justice Scalia looked at the text of the Amendment, and 
determined that the Confrontation Clause concerns only 
statements made by declarants who bear witness against the 
accused.  Thus, not all hearsay implicates the Constitution, 
only hearsay statements that are testimonial in nature do.49  
Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted that the Confrontation 
  
 43 Id. 
 44 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 41 (2004). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined 
Scalia’s majority opinion.  Id. at 37.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor 
concurred in the reversal, but argued that the result did not require overruling Roberts.  
Id. at 69. 
 47 Some lower courts have continued to apply Roberts to non-testimonial 
statements.  See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that 
unless statements are testimonial “Crawford is inapplicable and Roberts continues to 
apply”); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 200-01 (Conn. 2004) (“nontestimonial hearsay 
statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if it 
satisfies both prongs of the Roberts test, irrespective of whether the defendant had a 
prior opportunity to cross examine the declarant.”).  The general consensus, however, is 
that Roberts no longer has any precedential value.  See FISHER, supra note 35, at 431. 
 48 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a 
judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”). 
 49 Id. at 51 (“[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core 
concerns. . . . It applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who 
‘bear testimony.’”) (citing 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)). 
2006] RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF CRAWFORD 1639 
Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees a 
process by which the reliability of evidence is to be judged.50   
Accordingly, the Crawford Court criticized the Roberts 
test for being both too broad and too narrow.  Too broad, 
argued the Court, because it subjected non-testimonial 
statements to Constitutional scrutiny, and too narrow because 
it routinely admitted testimonial statements upon a mere 
showing of reliability, absent confrontation.51  Roberts’s 
“malleable standard,” according to the Court, “often fail[ed] to 
protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations.”52 
Crawford concluded, therefore, that “[w]here testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”53 
Although Justice Scalia and the Crawford Court opted 
not to define testimonial,54 clearly, according to the Court, 
Sylvia Crawford’s statement constituted testimony, and 
therefore, was barred by the Confrontation Clause.55  By telling 
the police that Lee did not have a weapon, and hence did not 
  
 50 Id. at 61 (“The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the 
desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but 
about how reliability can best be determined.”). 
 51 Id. at 60 (“First, [the Roberts test] is too broad:  It applies the same mode of 
analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony.  This often results 
in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of 
the Clause.  At the same time, however, the test is too narrow:  It admits statements 
that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 54 Id. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive 
definition of ‘testimonial.’”).  The Court did, however, offer the following three possible 
standards, but opts not to chose among them: 
1) “‘[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, 
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially’”; 
2) “‘[E]xtrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’”; 
and 
3) “‘[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.” 
Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted). 
 55 Id. at 68 (“Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to 
police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses 
at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”). 
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pose a threat to Michael Crawford, Sylvia Crawford bore 
witness, or testified, against her husband.  Because Sylvia 
Crawford did not appear at trial, Michael Crawford could not 
cross-examine her regarding her testimony.  Thus, admitting 
Sylvia’s statement as incriminating evidence against Michael 
Crawford constituted a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause 
violation. 
In summary, with Crawford, “the U.S. Supreme Court 
radically transformed its doctrine governing the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”56  
One commentator described the case as “a very positive 
development, restoring to its central position one of the basic 
protections of the common law system of criminal justice.”57   
Crawford, however, left many questions unanswered.58  
One such question is whether or not Crawford’s radical 
transformation59 of Confrontation Clause interpretation should 
be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.60  In other 
words, will a defendant with a final conviction based on 
hearsay evidence admissible under Roberts yet inadmissible 
under Crawford be able to attack his conviction on collateral 
review alleging a Crawford violation?  Although the Supreme 
Court has made retroactivity difficult to achieve,61 certainly a 
rule that drastically reinterprets62 a Constitutional guarantee 
as important63 as the Confrontation Clause should suffice. 
III. THE TEAGUE FRAMEWORK FOR RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
To resolve the question of retroactivity, one must 
analyze Crawford’s rule under the framework provided by 
Teague v. Lane.64  Decided in 1989, Teague articulated the 
  
 56 Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores 
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 5 (Summer 2004). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id.; see Mosteller, supra note 7, at 623 (“Crawford leaves many important 
issues undecided regarding the scope of its application.”). 
 59 Mosteller, supra note 7, at 511. 
 60 Richard Alan Ginkowski, Introduction to Friedman, supra note 56, at 5 
(“Also unclear is whether the holding may be applied retroactively.”).  
 61 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
 62 See supra note 7. 
 63 See supra notes 2-5. 
 64 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  The Teague standard only governs if direct appeal 
has been completed.  New rules apply retroactively to all criminal cases still pending 
on direct appeal.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004); Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). 
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current governing standard by which retroactivity is to be 
determined.65 
A. “New” or “Old”? 
The threshold question under Teague is whether the 
rule at issue is “new” or “old.”66  Essentially, “a case announces 
a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new 
obligation on the States or the Federal Government,”67 or “if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the 
defendant’s conviction became final.”68  In contrast, a rule is 
“old” for retroactivity purposes if it is a mere application of 
existing precedent.69  In Butler v. McKellar the Court 
expounded further on the Teague definition of a “new rule,” 
concluding that a rule is “new” if reasonable minds could have 
differed about the result of the decision before it was 
rendered.70  The great weight of the authority suggests that 
Crawford announced a “new” rule.71  Accordingly, this Note 
treats Crawford’s rule as “new” for the purposes of its 
analysis.72  “New” rules trigger Teague scrutiny. 
  
 65 LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 1355-61. 
 66 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see also People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 464 
(N.Y. 1995) (“The threshold issue in determining whether to apply a constitutional rule 
retroactively is characterization of the rule as “new” or “old.”). 
 67 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987)). 
 68 Id. (citing Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527, 528-29 (1987) (Powell, J., 
dissenting)). 
 69 Id. 
 70 494 U.S. 407, 417 (1990). 
 71 Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Teague thus prohibits 
Dorchy from availing himself of the new rule articulated in Crawford.”); Bintz v. 
Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It seems clear that Crawford was a 
clean break from the line of precedent established by Roberts. Crawford considered and 
rejected the continuing application of Roberts. . . . Crawford was thus a new rule for 
purposes of Teague.”); Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is obvious 
to us . . . that Crawford establishes a new rule.”); Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 
1015-16 (9th Cir. 2005) (“On balance, an analysis of the historical application of the 
Confrontation Clause cases leads to the conclusion that Crawford announces a new 
rule . . . .”); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Thus, Roberts and 
its progeny did not dictate the result in Crawford and we conclude that it announces a 
new rule of constitutional law.”); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(assuming for the purposes of Teague analysis that Crawford announced a new rule); 
see also Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying, in dictum, 
Teague’s “new rule” framework to the Crawford rule). 
 72 Some have argued that Crawford announced an “old” rule.  For interesting 
arguments, see Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J., 
concurring) (“Crawford, therefore, does not announce a new rule.  Retroactivity is not 
an issue.”); Murillo v. Frank, 316 F. Supp. 2d 744, 749-50 n.4 (E.D. Wisc. 2004) (“The 
question is close because although Crawford rejected the application of Roberts to 
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B. Teague’s “New” Rule Framework 
Essentially, Teague established a presumptive bar to 
the retroactive application of “new” rules on collateral review, 
subject to two exceptions.  The first exception allows for 
retroactivity if the conduct for which the defendant was 
convicted has become constitutionally protected, and the 
second, if the “new” rule is a watershed rule of criminal 
procedure, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.73  The first 
exception certainly does not apply to Crawford since 
Crawford’s rule does not concern conduct.  Therefore, if deemed 
a “new” rule, Crawford’s retroactivity hinges on whether it fits 
within the contours of the second exception.  In other words, to 
warrant retroactivity Crawford’s rule must be deemed a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty. 
C. Teague’s Second Exception as Interpreted by Subsequent 
Cases 
Teague’s second exception is decidedly difficult to 
satisfy.  In fact, the exception has grown “exceedingly 
narrow,”74 including only a “small core of rules requiring 
observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”75  Indeed, “it is not enough that a 
new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial, or even 
  
testimonial statements, the Court had never explicitly applied Roberts to such 
statements.’  Thus, it can be argued that Crawford did not announce a new rule at 
all.”) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Newland, 342 F. Supp. 2d 900, 924 (E.D. Cal. 
2004) (“Crawford did not announce a new rule at all but rather is entirely faithful to 
the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in this area”). 
  If a rule is deemed “old” it is applied retroactively to all cases on collateral 
review. See Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216 n.3 (1988) (“[W]hen a decision of this 
Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations, no 
real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply 
retrospectively.”).  Accordingly, only “new” rules are subject to analysis under the 
Teague exceptions. 
 73 The standard adopted by Teague originated with Justice Harlan. Justice 
Harlan, however, advocated a more lenient second exception. Under Justice Harlan’s 
standard a new rule would be retroactive if the previous rule created “an impermissibly 
large risk that the innocent will be convicted.” Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 
262 (1969). Thus, according to Justice Harlan “all ‘new’ constitutional rules which 
significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures are to be retroactively 
applied on habeas.” Id.  Teague, however, narrowed the second exception, requiring a 
rule to be a watershed rule of criminal procedure. 
 74 United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 528 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 75 Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 461, 478 (1993)). 
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that it promotes the objectives of fairness and accuracy.”76  But 
the adoption of a “new” rule must be a “ground breaking 
occurrence,”77 and one that “alter[s] our understanding of the 
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a 
proceeding.”78  Moreover, the rule must signal “a sweeping 
change that applies to a large swathe of cases rather than a 
narrow right that applies only to a limited class of cases.”79  
Notwithstanding the narrowness of Teague’s second exception, 
however, it must exist for a reason.  Therefore, certain rules, 
like Crawford, must be capable of fitting within its narrow 
contours.80 
Since Teague was decided in 1989 the Supreme Court 
has considered twelve “new” rules for retroactive application 
and has found them all insufficient.81  The Court recently noted 
that “it should come as no surprise that [it] ha[s] yet to find a 
new rule that falls under the second Teague exception.”82   
Additionally, the Supreme Court has declared several 
times that to achieve “watershed” status a new rule must 
compare, in terms of significance, with the rule espoused in 
Gideon v. Wainwright,83 which confered the right of counsel on 
indigent defendants.84  Thus, when the Court considers a “new” 
rule as a candidate for retroactivity, the Court compares the 
importance of the new rule to that of Gideon’s rule.85  No “new” 
rule has yet prevailed under this analysis.86  None considered, 
  
 76 Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 528 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 77 Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994). 
 78 Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241-42 (1990) (quoting Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971)). 
 79 Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 528 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 80 Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he bar is not 
absolute and the Crawford rule meets the Court’s criteria.”). 
 81 See Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 529 (“[Since 1989, b]eginning with the rule at 
issue in Teague, the Court has measured at least eleven new rules, or proposed new 
rules, of criminal procedure against the criteria for the second Teague exception and, in 
every case, has refused to apply the rule at issue retroactively on habeas review.”). 
Moreover, since Mandanici the Supreme Court has extended that streak by two, failing 
to apply the second Teague exception in two more cases.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 
U.S. 348, 355-58; Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2004). 
 82 Beard, 542 U.S. at 417. 
 83 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 84 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990); see Beard, 542 U.S. at 417. 
 85 See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996); Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 
(stating that a rule must be of the “primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in 
Gideon or other rules which may be thought to be within the exception”); Mandanici, 
205 F.3d at 528-29 (citing O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997)). 
 86 See supra note 12. 
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however, has carried the constitutional significance of 
Crawford.87 
IV. CRAWFORD IS A WATERSHED RULE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE ESSENTIAL TO FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, 
AND THUS, SHOULD BE MADE RETROACTIVE PURSUANT 
TO TEAGUE’S SECOND EXCEPTION 
Since the Supreme Court decided Teague it has not 
addressed the retroactivity of a “new” rule concerning the 
Confrontation Clause. Authority suggests, however, that 
Crawford satisfies Teague’s strictures.  Although the Supreme 
Court, under the Teague standard, has not made a “new” rule 
retroactive, every rule considered lacked the significance of 
Crawford’s rule.88 Indeed, Crawford is more akin to the Gideon 
rule89 than any rule that has sought retroactivity before the 
Court.   
Moreover, in both Roberts v. Russell90 and Barber v. 
Page91 the Supreme Court gave retroactive effect to a rule 
implicating the Confrontation Clause.  Although these 
decisions predate Teague, they demonstrate that the public 
interests that weigh against retroactivity must yield when they 
conflict with the right of confrontation.92   
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s holding in Cruz v. 
New York93 also implicated the Confrontation Clause,94 and was 
made retroactive by both the New York Court of Appeals95 and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.96  Both courts 
conducted retroactivity analysis under the Teague framework.97 
  
 87 See infra Part IV.A (arguing that Crawford is more significant that the 
other rules considered for retroactivity under Teague); see also supra note 12. 
 88 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 89 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (conferring the right of 
counsel on indigent defendants). 
 90 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968) (giving retroactive effect to Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which prohibited the admission, at a joint trial, of a 
codefendant’s inculpatory extrajudicial confession). 
 91 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
 92 Id. at 294-95. 
 93 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987) (barring admission of an interlocking confession of 
a non-testifying defendant). 
 94 Id. 
 95 People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 460 (N.Y. 1995). 
 96 Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 993 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 97 See id.; Eastman, 648 N.E.2d at 464-65. 
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Accordingly, if ever there could be a rule capable of 
satisfying Teague’s second exception, surely Crawford, giving 
new life to an essential and fundamental constitutional 
guarantee,98 should be it. 
A. Crawford is More Significant Than All the Previous 
“New” Rules That the Supreme Court has Declined to 
Apply Retroactively 
The Supreme Court has contemplated the retroactive 
application of a “new” rule twelve99 times, and each time 
determined that the rule at issue failed to satisfy the 
requirements of Teague’s second exception.100  None of those 
rules, however, implicated the Confrontation Clause.  The 
Crawford rule, according to the Supreme Court, corrects an 
“unpardonable [constitutional] vice.”101  Crawford is exactly the 
kind of rule contemplated by the second Teague exception.  
Indeed, Crawford has “the primacy and centrality of the rule 
adopted in Gideon,”102 and must succeed where the others have 
failed. 
Of the twelve “new” rules that have failed under 
Teague, nine concern sentencing, and hence, bear only 
  
 98 See discussion supra Parts I, II. 
 99 Teague itself, while formulating the retroactivity standard, considered the 
retroactivity of the rule announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  In 
Batson the Court held that if a defendant can establish a prima facie case that the 
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to eliminate members of the jury venire that 
were of the defendant’s race, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to rebut the inference 
of discrimination.  The prosecutor may rebut the inference of discrimination by 
showing a neutral reason for challenging the jurors, but if he cannot, the peremptory 
challenges constitute an Equal Protection violation.  Id. at 96-97. 
  The petitioner in Teague sought the benefit of Batson “even though his 
conviction became final before Batson was decided.”  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 294 
(1989).  Before Teague, however, the Supreme Court in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 
(1986), applying the pre-Teague retroactivity standard of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 636 (1965), found that Batson was not retroactive.  Teague found Allen v. Hardy 
“dispositive,” and hence, denied the petitioner the benefit of Batson.  Teague, 489 U.S. 
at 296. 
  Accordingly, Teague did not apply the standard it enunciated to the Batson 
rule, it deferred to Allen v. Hardy’s evaluation of Batson under the then-governing 
Linkletter standard.  Therefore, this Note does not address Teague’s holding with 
respect to the retroactivity of Batson. 
 100 See supra note 12; see also Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355-58 
(2004) (declining to make a new rule retroactive); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 419-20 
(2004) (same). 
 101 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). 
 102 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990). 
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tangentially on the accuracy of the trial.103  These sentencing 
rules are fundamentally different from, and less important to 
the truth-finding function than the Crawford rule.  Most 
significantly, sentencing rules affect only the portion of the 
trial subsequent to the verdict.  While the severity of a criminal 
defendant’s sentence is substantially important to the criminal 
justice system, Teague requires “new” rules to impact guilt or 
  
 103 First, in Schriro, the Supreme Court declined to give retroactive effect to 
the rule announce in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 355-58.  
Ring declared that the existence of an aggravating factor which could make a 
defendant eligible for the death sentence must be proved to a jury rather than a trial 
judge. 536 U.S. at 609.  The defendant in Schriro was sentenced to death under the 
previous rule, which allowed the trial judge, rather than the jury, to determine the 
presence of the aggravating factor. 542 U.S. at 350.  The defendant, Summerlin, sought 
the benefit of the Ring rule on habeas review, and his request was denied by a five to 
four decision of the Supreme Court. Id. at 350, 358.   
  The next two cases, Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004), and Graham v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993), the Supreme Court contemplated the retroactivity of 
“new” rules concerning the ability of the jury to consider mitigating factors in capital 
sentencing proceedings.  In Beard the Supreme Court examined the “new” rule of Mills 
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) which declared invalid capital sentencing schemes 
requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously. Id. at 375.  
Graham dealt with a proposed rule declaring as unconstitutional jury instructions 
which disallowed sentencing juries to consider mitigating evidence. 506 U.S. at 464.  
Both rules fell short of the Teague standard.  Beard, 542 U.S. at 419-20; Graham, 506 
U.S. at 463.   
  Fourth, in O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997), the Court held that 
the rule of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), which entitles a capital 
defendant to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution 
claims that he is a future danger, id. at 161-62, failed under Teague analysis. O’Dell, 
521 U.S. at 167.   
  Fifth, the rule announced in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992) (per 
curiam), also failed under Teague to achieve retroactive application as a “new” rule. 
Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 529.  Espinosa declared “that in certain states where a 
sentencing judge is required to give deference to a jury’s advisory sentencing 
recommendation with respect to the death penalty, neither the jury nor the judge is 
permitted to consider invalid aggravating circumstances.”  Id.   
  Sixth, Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996), declined to make 
retroactive a rule that the state’s failure to give adequate notice of some of the evidence 
it intended to use in the petitioners’ capital sentence proceeding violated due process. 
Id. at 170.   
  Seventh, Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 386, 396 (1994), declined to 
make retroactive a rule declaring that “twice subject[ing] a criminal defendant to a 
noncapital sentence enhancement proceeding” violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
  Eighth, Saffle, declined to apply retroactively a rule that the trial court’s 
instruction in the petitioner’s capital sentencing proceeding, “telling the jury to avoid 
any influence of sympathy, violates the Eighth Amendment.” 494 U.S. at 486.   
  Ninth, Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990), subjected the rule of Caldwell 
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) to Teague analysis, and like the others, the rule 
failed to satisfy Teague’s strict requirements. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-45.  Caldwell’s 
rule “prohibits the imposition of a death sentence by a sentencer that has been led to 
the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the 
defendant’s capital sentence lies elsewhere.”  Id. at 233 (citing Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 
328-29). 
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innocence to warrant retroactivity.104  Therefore, even a “new” 
rule of sentencing impacting the imposition of the death 
penalty—the harshest sentence available—will likely fail 
under Teague, because sentencing rules simply do not concern 
the determination of guilt or innocence.105   
In contrast, the Crawford rule interprets the right of 
confrontation, which is necessary to ferret out truth from an 
accuser’s testimony.  Crawford bears directly on the kind of 
information that reaches the jury, and it goes to the very heart 
of the truth-finding process.  A rule that implicates the 
accuracy of the truth-finding process certainly has the likely 
potential to impact guilt or innocence, as required by Teague.  
Accordingly, Crawford comports with Teague’s vision of a 
retroactive rule, while rules concerning sentencing do not. 
Of the “new” rule retroactivity candidates that did not 
concern sentencing, none were as important as Crawford.  
First, in Goeke v. Branch the Supreme Court refused to apply 
retroactively a rule that prohibited state appellate courts from 
dismissing the appeal of a recaptured fugitive.106  The Court 
aptly observed that since “due process does not require a State 
to provide appellate process at all, a former fugitive’s right to 
appeal cannot be said to be so central to an accurate 
determination of innocence or guilt as to fall within [the 
second] exception to the Teague bar.”107  On the contrary, the 
Constitution guarantees the right of confrontation, and the 
Supreme Court has incorporated it through the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.108  
Therefore, since Crawford implicates a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee, it deserves retroactivity more than a 
rule concerning a non-constitutional right to appeal. 
  
 104 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (“Because we operate from the 
premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of 
innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due 
process have yet to emerge.”). 
 105 Id.  Since the petitioner in Teague was not under a sentence of death the 
plurality limited its holding to the non-capital context.  The plurality, however, 
explicitly confirmed that the finality concerns that drove its analysis applied also in the 
capital context.  Id. at 314 n.2. 
 106 Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1995) (per curiam). 
 107 Id. at 120 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 108 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (“We hold today that the Sixth 
Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a 
fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
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Gilmore v. Taylor109 considered the retroactive 
application of the rule announced in Falconer v. Lane,110 and 
the Court again decided that the “new” rule failed to satisfy 
Teague’s strictures.111  Falconer declared that “the failure to 
instruct a jury that it could not return a murder conviction if it 
found that the defendant possessed a mitigating mental state 
violates due process.”112  A jury considers a mitigating mental 
state, however, only after it finds the facts constituting the 
underlying offense.  Thus, the Falconer rule bears on 
culpability, not the accuracy of the facts.  The Crawford rule, 
on the other hand, concerns the accuracy of the underlying 
facts.  Crawford provides the jury greater access to 
information, which significantly increases the likelihood that 
the jury will arrive at an accurate decision. 
Butler v. McKellar113 declined to make retroactive the 
rule announced in Arizona v. Roberson,114 which had declared 
that “the Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation 
following a suspect’s request for counsel in the context of a 
separate investigation.”115  Butler concluded that “[b]ecause a 
violation of Roberson’s added restrictions on police 
investigatory procedures would not seriously diminish the 
likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination – indeed, it 
may increase that likelihood – . . . Roberson did not establish 
any principle that would come within the second exception.”116  
Apparently, the Butler majority operated from the premise that 
a confession obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment may 
be truthful nonetheless, and hence, its admission at trial may 
in fact conduce to a more accurate fact-finding process.117  To be 
sure, the Fifth Amendment’s right not to self-incriminate 
enjoys comparable constitutional stature to the right to 
confront one’s accusers; however, the former aims to preserve 
the individual suspect’s dignity, while the latter aims to insure 
  
 109 508 U.S. 333 (1993). 
 110 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 111 Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 345 (holding that the Falconer rule does not “fall[] 
into that small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that . . . are 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 112 United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 529 (2d Cir. 2000) (summarizing 
the Falconer rule). 
 113 494 U.S. 407 (1990). 
 114 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
 115 Butler, 494 U.S. at 411 (citing Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682). 
 116 Id. at 416. 
 117 Id. 
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the accuracy of the trial.  Accordingly, since Teague insists that 
a retroactive rule impact the determination of innocence or 
guilt,118 Crawford is a better candidate for retroactivity than 
Roberson. 
The Supreme Court has invoked Gideon v. Wainwright, 
which conferred the right to counsel upon indigent 
defendants,119 to exemplify the type of case capable of satisfying 
Teague’s second exception.120  Crawford is of Gideon’s ilk.  
Gideon declared that a fair trial “cannot be realized if the poor 
man charged with a crime has to face his accusers without a 
lawyer to assist him.”121  One might naturally doubt the utility 
of a lawyer, however, without the right to face one’s accusers.  
Skilled lawyers and pro se litigants alike would be unable to 
mount a defense without the ability to confront adverse 
witnesses.   
For example, Michael Crawford was represented by 
counsel, yet his lawyer was not allowed to cross-examine 
Sylvia.  Had he been extended this “privilege,” he may have 
inquired as to her vantage point during the incident.  In turn 
she may have replied, truthfully in fact, that her eyes were 
closed.122  Indeed, a lawyer is often essential to the fairness of a 
proceeding, but before a lawyer can be effective the proceeding 
must comport with Crawford, allowing the defendant to 
confront testimonial statements.  In other words, the right of 
confrontation preserves and gives content to the right to 
counsel.  Accordingly, since the Court uses Gideon as its 
retroactivity benchmark, and since Crawford is just as, if not 
more, important to fairness and trial accuracy, Crawford must 
be made retroactive.123   
  
 118 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 119 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 120 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (“Although the precise contours of 
[the second Teague] exception may be difficult to discern, [the Court] ha[s] usually cited 
Gideon v. Wainwright, holding that a defendant has the right to be represented by 
counsel . . . to illustrate the type of rule coming within the exception.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 121 372 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added). 
 122 State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 WL 850119, at *5 (Wash. App. Div. 
2, July 30, 2001), rev’d, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002), rev’d sub nom., Crawford, 541 U.S. 
36 (“Sylvia stated that she shut her eyes during the stabbing. Cross-examination could 
show that she did not see Lee attack Michael because of this. We conclude that cross-
examination could reveal that she lacked knowledge of what happened.”). 
 123 See Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1019 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Recognizing 
that bedrock procedural rules are very few in number, it is no leap to conclude that the 
right of cross-examination as an adjunct to the constitutional right of confrontation 
joins the very limited company of Gideon.”). 
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To be sure, Teague and its progeny make it quite 
difficult for a “new” rule to achieve retroactive effect.  The 
twelve “new” rules that the Supreme Court has declined to 
make retroactive exemplify the narrowness of the Teague 
standard.  Nevertheless, no rule as significant as Crawford has 
yet endured Teague’s scrutiny.  The second Teague exception 
exists so that rules of the magnitude of Gideon and Crawford 
can achieve retroactive effect, while rules like the ones which 
hitherto have failed will not upset society’s countervailing 
interests.  The second Teague exception is narrow, but not 
closed, and Crawford satisfies its requirements.124 
B. The Supreme Court’s Language in Crawford Indicates 
That the Confrontation Clause is a Bedrock 
Constitutional Guarantee Essential to a Fair Trial  
The Supreme Court’s language in the Crawford opinion 
suggests that its rule is important enough to prevail under a 
Teague retroactivity analysis.125  In Crawford, the Supreme 
Court expressly stated its view that the right of confrontation 
is a “bedrock procedural guarantee,”126 and that Roberts 
constituted an egregious constitutional flaw.  Although none of 
the Court’s language speaks specifically to the retroactivity 
issue, one can reasonably infer from the Court’s language that 
Crawford warrants retroactivity. 
Justice Scalia consulted history, and determined that 
“the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused.”127  Moreover, the Court declared that the 
  
 124 See, e.g., Valladares, supra note 7, at 12, 16 (“There is a strong argument 
that Crawford is one of those very rare new rules that is essential to our concepts of 
fundamental fairness.”). 
 125 See Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1016 (“That the Crawford requirement is 
fundamental to our legal regime is beyond dispute.  Justice Scalia’s eloquent recitation 
of the history, purpose, and place of the Confrontation Clause and cross-examination 
answers this question.”); People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, 
at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (“The language used in the Crawford decision itself 
also lends support to the view that its declaration of the rule prohibiting the admission 
of testimonial statements at trial unless they have been subject to cross-examination is 
watershed.”). 
 126 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
 127 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).  In particular, Justice Scalia recounted the 
1603 treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.  Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, 
implicated Raleigh in letters.  Cobham did not testify, but his letters were read at 
Raleigh’s trial.  According to Justice Scalia, 
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right of confrontation is the Sixth Amendment’s “primary 
object,”128 and deemed the right a “categorical constitutional 
guarantee[].”129 
Additionally, the Roberts framework, according to 
Crawford, was “fundamentally at odds” with the Confrontation 
Clause130 and hence, “[did] violence to [its] design.”131  While 
Roberts admitted hearsay based on notions of reliability,132 
Crawford declared that the only constitutionally permissible 
method by which to determine reliability is “testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination.”133  Indeed, the Court notes that 
Michael Crawford’s conviction under Roberts “reveal[ed] a 
fundamental failure on [the Court’s] part to interpret the 
Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on 
judicial discretion.”134 
Although Crawford did not contemplate retroactivity, it 
couched its holding in strong, unequivocal language, intimating 
that its rule should satisfy Teague.  Indeed, to hold otherwise 
would render Crawford’s language meaningless rhetoric. 
C. Two Supreme Court Cases, Though Predating Teague, 
Dictate That Crawford Should Be Retroactive 
In two cases, Roberts v. Russell135 and Berger v. 
California,136 the Court deemed rules implicating the 
Confrontation Clause retroactive.  Although both cases predate 
  
Raleigh argued that Cobham had lied to save himself:  “Cobham is absolutely 
in the King’s mercy; to excuse me cannot avail him; by accusing me he may 
hope for favor.”  Suspecting that Cobham would recant, Raleigh demanded 
that the judges call him to appear, arguing that “[t]he Proof of the Common 
Law is by witness and jury:  let Cobham be here, let him speak it.  Call my 
accuser before my face . . . .”  The Judges refused, and, despite Raleigh’s 
protestations that he was being tried “by the Spanish Inquisition,” the jury 
convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to death. 
Id. at 44 (internal citations omitted).  Justice Scalia then noted, “[O]ne of Raleigh’s 
trial judges later lamented that ‘the justice of England has never been so degraded 
and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.’”  Id. 
 128 Id. at 53. 
 129 Id. at 67-68. 
 130 Id. at 61. 
 131 Id. at 68. 
 132 See supra Part II (discussing the Roberts framework). 
 133 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 134 Id. at 67. 
 135 392 U.S. 293 (1968). 
 136 393 U.S. 314 (1969). 
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Teague, they are persuasive evidence of the high regard in 
which the Court holds the Confrontation Clause. 
1. Bruton v. United States 
Bruton v. United States137 concerned Bruton, who had 
been convicted of robbery.138  He was tried jointly with his 
alleged accomplice, Evans.139  Evans did not testify at the trial, 
but the prosecution introduced his oral confession, which 
incriminated Bruton.140  Bruton challenged his conviction, 
claiming that the trial judge erred by admitting Evans’s 
confession in violation of his, Bruton’s, confrontation right.141  
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, applying Delli 
Paoli v. United States,142 upheld Bruton’s conviction because 
the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider Evans’s 
confession when determining Bruton’s guilt.143  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court overruled Delli Paoli, and reversed the Eighth 
Circuit, holding that “despite instructions to the jury to 
disregard the implicating statements in determining the 
codefendant’s guilt or innocence, admission at a joint trial of a 
  
 137 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
 138 Id. at 124. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id.  Evans also challenged his conviction and prevailed after the Circuit 
Court held that Evans’s confession was obtained in violation of the recently decided 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, n.1. 
 142 352 U.S. 232 (1957).  Delli Paoli allowed a codefendant’s confession to be 
admitted at a joint trial if the judge gave limiting instructions. Id. at 239. 
 143 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124-25. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:  
A confession made outside of court by one defendant may not be considered 
as evidence against the other defendant, who was not present and in no way 
a party to the confession. Therefore, if you find that a confession was in fact 
voluntarily and intentionally made by the defendant Evans, you should 
consider it as evidence in the case against Evans, but you must not consider 
it, and should disregard it, in considering the evidence in the case against the 
defendant Bruton. 
. . . .   
It is your duty to give separate, personal consideration to the cause of each 
individual defendant. When you do so, you should analyze what the evidence 
shows with respect to that individual, leaving out of consideration entirely 
any evidence admitted solely against some other defendant. Each defendant 
is entitled to have his case determined from his own acts and statements and 
the other evidence in the case which may be applicable to him.” Id. at 125 n.2 
(quoting Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 362 n.6 (1967), rev’d sub nom., 
Bruton, 391 U.S. 123) (alteration in original).  
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defendant’s extra-judicial confession implicating a codefendant 
violated the codefendant’s right of cross-examination.”144 
In Roberts v. Russell145 the Supreme Court applied the 
Bruton rule retroactively.  The Russell Court held that “the 
error” from Delli Paoli in admitting such statements “‘went to 
the basis of fair hearing and trial because the procedural 
apparatus never assured the [petitioner] a fair determination’ 
of his guilt or innocence.”146  With “[d]ue regard for 
countervailing considerations,” the Russell Court concluded 
that “even if the impact of retroactivity may be significant, the 
constitutional error presents a serious risk that the issue of 
guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined.”147  
Accordingly, the Court determined that the Bruton rule must 
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.148 
Although Russell was decided in 1968, twenty-one years 
before Teague narrowed the scope of habeas review, its holding 
remains significant even after Teague.  Teague relied heavily 
on the importance of finality and the administration of 
justice.149  The Russell Court clearly considered these 
“countervailing”150 interests yet concluded that “the impact of 
retroactivity upon the administration of justice [did] not 
counsel against retroactivity of Bruton.  The element of 
reliance [was] not persuasive . . . .”151   
Moreover, Teague’s primary departure from existing 
retroactivity doctrine was the second prong of its second 
  
 144 Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1969). 
 145 392 U.S. 293. 
 146 Id. at 294 (alteration in original) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 639 n.20 (1965)).  The Bruton Court elaborated: 
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, 
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the 
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system 
cannot be ignored.  Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully 
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant . . . are deliberately 
spread before the jury in a joint trial. 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36 (citations omitted). 
 147 Russell, 392 U.S. at 295 (emphasis added). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Application of constitutional 
rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the 
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.”). 
 150 Russell, 392 U.S. at 295. 
 151 Id. (citation omitted) (“Due regard for countervailing considerations—
reliance on the old standard of Delli Paoli and the impact of retroactivity upon the 
administration of justice—does not counsel against retroactivity of Bruton.  The 
element of reliance is not persuasive . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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exception,152 which requires a new rule to be “watershed” and to 
“implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial.”153  Indeed, 
Russell, though not constitutionally required to do so (as 
Teague had not yet imposed the obligation), contemplated this 
aspect of the Bruton rule, and predicated its holding of 
retroactivity on the belief that to deny the benefit of the rule 
would “present[] a serious risk that the issue of guilt or 
innocence may not have been reliably determined.”154   
Additionally, the Russell Court likened the Bruton rule 
of Confrontation Clause interpretation to the rule of Gideon v. 
Wainwright.155  Courts have often refused to hold “new” rules 
retroactive because the Supreme Court instructs that a new 
rule must be comparable to the Gideon rule to warrant 
retroactivity.156  Russell cited Gideon to support its proposition 
that the Supreme Court has “retroactively applied rules of 
criminal procedure fashioned to correct flaws in the fact-finding 
process at trial.”157  Relying on Gideon as authority indicates 
that the Court believed the right of confrontation to be 
tantamount to the right to counsel.   
It thus seems very reasonable to conclude that the 
Russell analysis, though not controlled by Teague, was just as 
demanding, and that even under the Teague standard the 
Russell Court would have applied Bruton retroactively.  Since 
Crawford’s rule is similar to Bruton’s, Crawford deserves equal 
consideration when subjected to retroactivity analysis. 
2. Barber v. Page 
Likewise, the Supreme Court applied Barber v. Page158 
retroactively in Berger v. California.159  Barber v. Page declared 
  
 152 See supra note 74. 
 153 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 312. 
 154 Russell, 392 U.S. at 295. 
 155 Russell, 392 U.S. at 294 (comparing Bruton to Gideon). 
 156 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004); Saffle v. Parks, 494 
U.S. 484, 495 (1990).  Gideon v. Wainwright conferred on indigent defendants the right 
to counsel.  372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 157 Russell, 392 U.S. at 294 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 
(1967)). 
 158 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
 159 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (“[W]e can see no reason why Barber v. Page 
should not be given fully retroactive application.”).  See generally People v. Watson, No. 
7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *8 n.5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (“[A]t the 
time that Berger v. California and Roberts v. Russell were decided, the retroactivity of 
any new rule was determined under the [Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)] 
standard, regardless of when the defendant’s conviction became final.”). 
2006] RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF CRAWFORD 1655 
that the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness currently 
outside of the jurisdiction is inadmissible absent a good faith 
effort by the state to secure the witness’s presence.160  In 
deeming the rule retroactive, the Berger Court determined that 
notwithstanding the state’s “countervailing interests,”161 the 
opportunity to cross-examine a witness has a “significant effect 
on the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process.’”162  Barber and 
Crawford alike make it more difficult for the prosecution to use 
evidence absent confrontation, and both cases stand on the 
proposition that the Confrontation Clause is essential to 
fairness.  Since Barber was made retroactive, so should 
Crawford be. 
In summary, Crawford’s rule is of comparable 
importance to the rules of Bruton and Barber.  All three rules 
seek to give content to the same “bedrock procedural 
guarantee,”163 the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment.  Bruton held that a codefendant’s confession may 
not be admitted as evidence at a joint trial, regardless of 
cautionary jury instructions,164 and Barber made inadmissible 
statements of non-testifying, out-of-jurisdiction witnesses.165  
Similarly, Crawford held that “testimonial” statements were 
inadmissible absent the opportunity for cross-examination.166  
Each rule corrected a similar constitutional vice.167  Since 
Teague, the Supreme Court has not considered the retroactivity 
of a “new” rule concerning the Confrontation Clause.  
Nevertheless, since Berger and Russell imply that 
Confrontation Clause violations affect the fairness and 
accuracy of the trial, even under Teague, both rules would 
  
 160 Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25 (“In short, a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for 
purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the 
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at 
trial. . . . The right of confrontation may not be dispensed with so lightly.”). 
 161 Berger, 393 U.S. at 315 (“California’s claim of . . . countervailing 
interest[s] . . . is most unpersuasive.”). 
 162 Id. (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639). 
 163 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
 164 Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 293 (1968) (summarizing Bruton). 
 165 Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25. 
 166 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, 
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one 
the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”). 
 167 See Russell, 392 U.S. at 294; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (“The unpardonable 
vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated 
capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly 
meant to exclude.”). 
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deserve retroactivity.168  Crawford, like Bruton and Barber 
before it, corrected an error in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. Accordingly, Crawford, when subjected to 
Teague’s scrutiny, should be given full retroactive effect. 
D. The Retroactivity of Cruz v. New York Dictates that 
Crawford Qualifies for the Second Teague Exception 
Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals169 and the New 
York Court of Appeals170 retroactively applied the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Cruz v. New York.171  Both courts analyzed 
retroactivity under Teague, and both concluded that the Cruz 
rule was sufficiently “watershed” to fit within Teague’s second 
exception.  Since both Cruz and Crawford implicate the 
Confrontation Clause, and since Crawford is at least as, if not 
more, necessary to the fundamental fairness and accuracy of 
the trial, Crawford also deserves retroactive application.   
Cruz v. New York concerned Eulogio and Benjamin 
Cruz, who were tried jointly for the felony murder of a gas 
station attendant.172  At trial, prosecutors played a taped 
statement made by Benjamin, which incriminated Eulogio.173  
Benjamin did not testify at trial, and hence was unavailable to 
Eulogio for cross-examination.174  The judge, recognizing that 
Benjamin’s statement was inadmissible against Eulogio, 
instructed the jury not to consider Benjamin’s statement when 
determining Eulogio’s guilt.175  Eulogio had also confessed, but 
his confession was found inadmissible.  The jury returned a 
guilty verdict against Eulogio despite the lack of admissible 
  
 168 One court recently noted that 
[N]otwithstanding the fact that Roberts v. Russell and Berger v. California 
were not decided according to the Teague standard, they support the view 
that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is a watershed rule, 
because they indicate that a violation of this right implicates the fairness of 
the trial and the accuracy of the fact-finding process. 
People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 
8, 2004). 
 169 Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 983 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 170 People v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265, 268 (1995). 
 171 481 U.S. 186 (1987). 
 172 Id. at 189. 
 173 Id. at 188-89. 
 174 Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 188-89 (1987). 
 175 Id. at 189. 
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evidence linking him to the murder.176  Eulogio’s conviction was 
upheld on appeal because Eulogio’s own confession, not 
admitted at trial, “interlocked” with Benjamin’s. 177  In other 
words, Benjamin’s statement was inadmissible against Eulogio, 
and Eulogio’s own confession was also inadmissible against 
Eulogio, but since both statements were similar, or 
“interlocking,” Eulogio’s conviction was upheld despite the lack 
of admissible evidence.178 
The Supreme Court, in Cruz v. New York, reversed 
Eulogio’s conviction because it violated the Confrontation 
Clause.179 Specifically, Cruz contemplated “interlocking 
confessions,” and held that “where a nontestifying 
codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is not 
directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation 
Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is 
instructed not to consider it against the defendant.”180 
Before Cruz, statements of this sort were frequently 
admitted if they were “factually consistent” with or 
  
 176 Id. (“At the trial’s end, however, Norberto’s testimony stood as the only 
evidence admissible against Eulogio that directly linked him to the crime.”  But 
nevertheless, “the jury convicted both defendants.”). 
 177 The New York Court of Appeals explained “interlocking confessions” as 
follows, 
Confessions are “interlocking” if their content is substantially similar.  The 
statements need not be identical, it is sufficient that both cover all major 
elements of the crime involved and are “essentially the same” as to motive, 
plot and execution of the crimes.  Statements are substantially similar when 
defendant’s confession is close enough to the codefendant’s with respect to the 
material facts of the crime charged to make the probability of prejudice so 
negligible that the end result would be the same without the codefendant’s 
statement.  Confessions do not “interlock,” however, if a codefendant’s 
confession may be used to fill material gaps in the necessary proof against 
defendant. 
People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61, 70 (citations omitted).  The court concluded that the Cruz 
brothers’ statements did, in fact, “interlock”: 
[T]he Cruz brothers agreed, in their separate statements, on the date and 
target of the crime, the participants in it, the motive of robbery, and the 
essential facts of how defendant was injured and the station attendant killed.  
Although Benjamin’s statement was substantially longer, the details included 
did not contradict or modify the essential elements of defendant’s statement.   
Id. at 71. 
 178 Id. at 65. 
 179 Cruz, 481 U.S. 186, 189 (1987).  
 180 Id. at 193.  “Cruz . . . repudiated the interlocking confession exception to 
the Bruton rule that the Parker plurality and several Courts of Appeals . . . previously 
had recognized. . . .  Parker commonly was perceived as having endorsed an 
interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule.”  Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 
993 (2d Cir. 1991). 
1658 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4 
“substantially similar” to the defendant’s own statement.181  
The Cruz Court, however, declared the use of such statements 
constitutionally unsound, and in direct conflict with the 
precedent established in Bruton.182  Cruz’s author, Justice 
Scalia, concluded that “[t]he law cannot command respect if 
such an inexplicable exception to a supposed constitutional 
imperative is adopted.”183 
Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the New 
York Court of Appeals applied the Cruz holding retroactively 
under the second Teague exception.  In their analyses, both 
courts determined that the Cruz rule involved a “bedrock 
procedural element.”184  New York’s highest court, in People v. 
Eastman, proclaimed that “Cruz unquestionably . . . implicates 
a bedrock procedural element,”185 while the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in Graham, announced that “there [could] be 
little doubt that the decision altered our understanding of a 
bedrock procedural principle.”186  Graham continued that “[t]he 
‘bedrock procedural element’ implicated in Cruz was the right 
of confrontation; a right which the Supreme Court long ago 
referred to as being ‘one of the fundamental guarantees of life 
and liberty,’”187 and cited with approval the notion that “[t]he 
right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial 
procedure.  It is implicit in the constitutional right of 
confrontation.”   
Eastman and Graham then determined that, in addition 
to implicating a “fundamental procedural guarantee,” 
application of the Cruz rule is essential to a fair trial.188  
According to the Eastman court, the Cruz rule is necessary in 
order for “the procedural apparatus of trial . . . [to] assure[] the 
  
 181 People v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265, 273-74, 274 n.4 (1995). 
 182 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (holding that a defendant is 
deprived of his Confrontation Clause rights when a codefendant’s incriminating 
confession is introduced at their joint trial, even if cautionary instructions were given 
to the jury to disregard the statement). 
 183 481 U.S. at 193. 
 184 Graham, 946 F.2d at 993; Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276.  Graham did not 
actually make the determination of whether Cruz announced a “new” or an “old” rule.  
However, the court reasoned that the rule is retroactive either way.  Graham, 946 F.2d 
at 992 (“[W]e find it unnecessary to categorize the Cruz rule as either a ‘new’ or ‘old’ 
rule of constitutional criminal procedure.  Rather, we . . . believe that regardless of 
whether the Cruz rule is characterized as a ‘new’ or ‘old’ rule it should be applied 
retroactively.”). 
 185 Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276. 
 186 Graham, 946 F.2d at 993. 
 187 Id. at 994 (quoting Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899)). 
 188 Id. at 993-94; Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276. 
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defendant a fair determination of guilt or innocence,”189 and the 
admission of the types of statements proscribed by Cruz 
“undermine[s] . . . fundamental fairness.”190  Similarly, Graham 
held that the Cruz rule is necessary to “ensure[] a fair 
proceeding.”191  Graham concluded that “[t]he Cruz rule . . . 
satisfies [Teague’s] second exception to the general rule against 
retroactive application of ‘new’ constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure,”192 and that “[e]ven if the impact of retroactivity may 
be significant, the constitutional error presents a serious risk 
that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably 
determined.”193 
The Crawford rule is analogous to the Cruz rule, and 
hence, deserves equal treatment for retroactivity purposes.  
Both rules severely limited the kind of evidence which may be 
admitted without cross-examination; Cruz rejected 
“interlocking” confessions,194 while Crawford rejected all 
“testimonial” statements.195  Both corrected flaws in the Court’s 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.196 
In fact, Crawford corrected an even greater affront to 
the Confrontation Clause than did Cruz.  In Cruz, the 
defendant and codefendant were tried jointly, but the 
codefendant’s statement was introduced only against the 
codefendant; the court explicitly directed jurors not to consider 
the statement in evaluating Cruz’s guilt.197  Even though the 
Cruz Court concluded that jurors could not reasonably be 
expected to obey such an instruction,198 the resulting 
Confrontation Clause violation was still indirect.  The Cruz 
trial court recognized that jurors should not consider the 
testimony at issue, and instructed the jury accordingly.   
On the other hand, in Crawford, the trial court admitted 
testimonial hearsay directly against the defendant.  Limiting 
instructions were never given, not even difficult or impossible-
  
 189 Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Graham, 946 F.2d at 993-94. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 994 (quoting Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968)). 
 194 Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987). 
 195 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2005). 
 196 Id. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”); Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193 (“The 
law cannot command respect if such an inexplicable exception to a supposed 
constitutional imperative is adopted.”). 
 197 Cruz, 481 U.S. at 189. 
 198 Id. at 193. 
1660 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4 
to-obey ones.199  The court invited the Crawford jury to consider 
the ex parte accusatory statement for its truth in deciding 
whether or not to convict.200  Therefore, reason dictates that if 
Cruz twice achieved retroactive effect under Teague, then 
surely Crawford, correcting an even more egregious 
constitutional malady, should receive equal consideration. 
E. Litigation Concerning Crawford’s Retroactivity has 
Begun, and Lower State and Federal Courts Are in 
Disagreement 
Of the five federal circuits that have ruled on 
Crawford’s retroactivity, only one concluded that Crawford’s 
rule qualified under Teague’s second exception.201  Those failing 
to find Crawford retroactive, however, have done so after only a 
cursory analysis.202  Some have flatly stated that Crawford is 
not “watershed,” effectively assuming that which they should 
be attempting to prove.203  Others have chosen to make the fact 
that Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless 
  
 199 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41. 
 200 Id. at 40. 
 201 The Ninth Circuit has held Crawford retroactive under the second Teague 
exception.  Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1019-21 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Second, 
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have decided not to make Crawford retroactive.  
Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2005); Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 786, 
790 (7th Cir. 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005); Mungo v. 
Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th 
Cir. 2004).  The Eighth Circuit has indicated that Crawford is not retroactive.  Evans 
v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (suggesting in dicta that Crawford 
does not apply retroactively).  
 202 See, e.g., Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1020 (“The flaw in this analysis [declining 
to make Crawford retroactive] is that the Second Circuit has substituted its judgment 
of whether the Crawford rule is one without which the accuracy of conviction is 
seriously diminished, for the Supreme Court’s considered judgment.”); People v. 
Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) 
(“For the most part, however, with little analysis, these courts have generally held that 
Crawford . . . did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure.”  The court 
continued that, “[w]here explanations have been proffered for this conclusion, these 
courts have generally pointed to the fact that a Confrontation Clause violation is 
subject to harmless error analysis.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Brown, 381 F.3d at 1226; Evans, 371 F.3d at 444-45; Garcia v. 
United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 WL 1752588, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004); 
Hutzenlaub v. Portuondo, 325 F. Supp. 2d 236, 237-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Wheeler v. 
Dretke, No. Civ.A. 404CV026Y, 2004 WL 1532178, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2004); 
Murillo v. Frank, 316 F. Supp.2d 744, 749 (E.D. Wis. 2004), aff’d, 402 F.3d 786. Some 
state courts have held similarly.  See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1122 (Ct. 
App. Colo. 2004), aff’d, 129 P.3d 977, No. 04SC565, 2006 WL 320992 (Colo. Feb. 13, 
2006); People v. Khan, No. 499-90, 2004 WL 1463027, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23, 
2004). 
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error204 analysis fatal to Crawford’s retroactivity.205  The 
Supreme Court, however, has never indicated that a rule 
subject to harmless error analysis may not be deemed 
“watershed” under Teague.206  In fact, the constitutional error 
corrected by Cruz was also subject to harmless error analysis, 
yet it was made retroactive by the New York Court of Appeals 
and the Second Circuit.207  Therefore, that a Confrontation 
Clause violation may not require automatic reversal does not 
preclude the rule from fitting within the second Teague 
exception. 
Two New York Appellate Division cases, citing 
Eastman, recently found Crawford retroactive under the 
second Teague exception.  People v. Watson208 and People v. 
Dobbin209 both held that since Eastman declared that Cruz 
satisfied Teague, then so does Crawford.210  The implicit logic in 
Watson and Dobbin is clear.  Both courts analogized Cruz to 
Crawford, and concluded that the Crawford rule is at least as, 
if not more, constitutionally imperative than the Cruz rule.  
Thus, because Cruz satisfied Teague, Crawford does as well.  
Since the New York Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit 
applied Cruz retroactively on collateral review,211 making 
Crawford retroactive was the only sensible conclusion.212 
  
 204 Harmless error review means that even if there was a mistake at trial the 
verdict will stand unless the mistake affected the substantial rights of the parties.  See 
LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 1298. 
 205 See, e.g., Brown, 381 F.3d at 1226-27; Garcia, 2004 WL 1752588, at *4 
(N.D.N.Y. 2004).  “These courts have reasoned that because Confrontation Clause 
errors are subject to harmless error review, new rules altering the clause’s application 
do not deprive a defendant of his or her fundamental right to due process and, 
therefore, [Crawford] cannot be considered a watershed rule.”  People v. Watson, No. 
7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (citation 
omitted). 
 206 Watson, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *10 n.7 (“The Supreme Court has 
never issued any decision . . . indicating that a rule which is subject to harmless error 
analysis cannot be considered a watershed rule.”); see also Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1020 
(“[W]hether a rule of constitutional law is subject to harmless error review does not 
answer the question whether it is a bedrock rule of procedure.”). 
 207 See discussion supra notes 167-91 and accompanying text. 
 208 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133. 
 209 791 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 210 Watson, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *9 (“[A]pplying Teague’s 
teachings, this court finds that the rule announced in Crawford is a ‘watershed’ rule of 
Criminal Procedure, and thus applies to cases on collateral review.”); Dobbin, 791 
N.Y.S.2d at 905 (“[T]he Crawford rule must be applied retroactively on collateral 
review.”) (italics added). 
 211 Watson and Dobbin were New York Appellate Division cases.  Thus, People 
v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265 (1995), decided by the New York Court of Appeals, was 
 
1662 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4 
V. CONCLUSION 
With Crawford the Supreme Court corrected an 
“unpardonable”213 flaw in its jurisprudence, and restored the 
Confrontation Clause to its rightful status as a bedrock 
constitutional guarantee essential to a fair trial.  
Notwithstanding the high bar set by Teague and its progeny, 
Crawford deserves to be applied retroactively.   
As a “new” rule, Crawford’s retroactivity turns on 
whether it fits within the contours of the second Teague 
exception.  Teague adopted a strict standard for the retroactive 
application of “new” rules, so strict in fact that the Supreme 
Court has yet to find a rule capable of satisfying it.  The Court, 
however, has never applied the Teague framework to a rule as 
significant as Crawford’s.  Crawford is more important than, 
and thus distinguishable from, its “new” rule predecessors, all 
of which failed under Teague.   
What separates Crawford from other “new” rules not 
worthy of retroactivity is its subject, the Confrontation Clause.  
Prior to Teague, the Supreme Court twice gave retroactive 
effect to “new” rules concerning the Confrontation Clause, both 
times concluding that to deprive a defendant of the right of 
confrontation was to withhold a fundamental constitutional 
guarantee essential to a fair trial.  Furthermore, the New York 
Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit both applied the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Cruz v. New York retroactively, 
demonstrating that even under the strict Teague framework, 
the importance of the Confrontation Clause outweighs the 
negative implications of retroactivity.   
Roberts’s malleable test rendered the Confrontation 
Clause constitutionally infirm.  With Crawford, the Supreme 
Court resuscitated the right of confrontation, and with it, the 
legitimacy of criminal trials. The Supreme Court admittedly 
“[did] violence to [the] design” of the Confrontation Clause 
  
binding precedent; Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1991), decided by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, was merely persuasive. 
 212 Recently the Second Circuit held that Crawford is not retroactive under 
Teague, yet failed to cite Graham in its analysis.  Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336 
(2d Cir. 2004).  Nor did the court make any attempt to distinguish the Cruz rule, made 
retroactive in Graham, with the Crawford rule.  Id.  See Part IV.D, supra, for a 
comparison of Crawford to Cruz, and for an argument that Crawford, in fact, corrected 
an even more serious constitutional flaw. 
 213 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). 
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when it endorsed the Roberts test,214 and limiting Crawford to 
prospective application would exacerbate Roberts’s damage.   
In summary, neither history nor precedent leaves any 
doubt that the right of confrontation is crucial to a fair trial, 
Roberts denied criminal defendants the enjoyment of that 
right, and Crawford corrected Roberts’s mistake.  Only one 




 214 Id. at 67-68 (“By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-
ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”). 
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